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Wittgenstein	  on	  “Beautiful”	  and	  “The	  Beautiful”	  
Gabriele	  Tomasi	  
In	   his	   Lectures	   on	   Aesthetics	   (1938)	   Wittgenstein	   notices	   how	   unimportant	   the	   role	  
played	  by	  the	  adjective	  “beautiful”	  is	  when	  aesthetic	  judgments	  are	  made	  (cfr.	  LA,	  I,	  8)1.	  
In	  a	  remark	  from	  1946	  he	  goes	  far	  beyond	  and	  talks	  of	  the	  mischief	  done	  by	  the	  concept	  
of	  “the	  beautiful”	   (CV,	  55e).	  This	  may	  appear	  puzzling,	   if	   compared	   to	  a	  note	   from	  his	  
Notebooks	  1914-­‐16	  where	  –	  maybe	  a	  bit	  out	  of	  tune	  with	  the	  Zeitgeist	  –	  he	  states	  that	  
«there	  is	  certainly	  something	  in	  the	  conception	  that	  the	  end	  of	  art	  is	  the	  beautiful»	  (NB,	  
21.10.16)2.	  The	  obvious	  explanation	  of	  the	  tension	  among	  these	  statements	  would	  be	  to	  
connect	   it	   to	   the	  change	  of	   the	  views	   that	  Wittgenstein	  held	   in	  his	  early	  work,	  and	   to	  
 
1	  Abbreviations	   for	  Wittgenstein’s	   works	   in	   the	   text	   are	   as	   follows:	  AWL	   =	  Wittgenstein’s	   Lec-­‐
tures.	  Cambridge,	  1932-­‐1935,	  ed.	  by	  A.	  Ambrose,	  Blackwell,	  Oxford	  1979;	  BB	  =	  L.	  Wittgenstein,	  
The	  Blue	  and	  Brown	  Books,	  Harper	  Torchbooks,	  New	  York	  1958;	  CV	  =	  L.	  Wittgenstein,	  Culture	  and	  
Value,	  ed.	  by	  G.	  H.	  von	  Wright	  in	  collaboration	  with	  H.	  Nyman,	  transl.	  by	  P.	  Winch,	  Blackwell,	  Ox-­‐
ford	  1980;	  LC	  =	  Lectures	  and	  Conversations	  on	  Aesthetics,	  Psychology	  &	  Religious	  Belief,	  ed.	  by	  
Cyril	  Barrett,	  Blackwell,	  Oxford	  1966;	  LA	  =	  Lectures	  on	  Aesthetics	  (in	  LC);	  LE	  =	  “Wittgenstein’s	  Lec-­‐
ture	  on	  Ethics”,	  The	  Philosophical	  Review,	  74	  (1965),	  3-­‐12;	  NB	  =	  Notebooks	  1914-­‐1916,	  ed.	  by	  G.	  
H.	  von	  Wright	  and	  G.	  E.	  M.	  Anscombe	  with	  an	  English	  translation	  by	  G.	  E.	  M.	  Anscombe,	  Black-­‐
well,	   Oxford	   1961;	   TLP	   =	   Tractatus	   logico-­‐philosophicus,	   with	   an	   introduction	   by	   B.	   Russell,	  
Routledge	  &	  Kegan	  Paul,	  London	  19515.	  References	  to	  AWL,	  BB,	  CV	  and	  LE	  are	  by	  page	  number;	  
references	  to	  LA	  are	  to	  section	  and	  page	  number;	  references	  to	  TLP	  are	  to	  section	  number;	  refer-­‐
ences	  to	  NB	  are	  by	  entry	  date.	  
2	  It	  is	  striking	  that	  when	  he	  wrote	  his	  s	  entry	  on	  the	  beautiful	  as	  the	  end	  of	  art,	  Marcel	  Duchamp	  
had	  already	  created	  his	  Bicycle	  Wheel	  (1913),	  The	  Bottle	  Rack	  (1914)	  and	  In	  Advance	  of	  the	  Bro-­‐
ken	  Arm	  (1915),	  with	  the	  clear	  intention	  to	  break	  with	  the	  category	  of	  the	  beautiful	  and	  the	  no-­‐
tion	  of	  taste.	  On	  the	  aim	  of	  art	  Wittgenstein	  seems	  more	  in	  accord	  with	  the	  elderly	  Claude	  Mo-­‐
net.	  In	  those	  same	  years	  when	  Wittgenstein	  was	  at	  the	  front	  line,	  Monet	  was	  working	  at	  his	  Wa-­‐
ter-­‐Lilies	  with	  the	  intention	  to	  offer	  to	  the	  French	  people,	  traumatized	  by	  the	  war,	  «the	  repairer	  
sight	  of	  the	  cosmic	  order	  and	  the	  consolation	  of	  beauty»	  (Georgel	  [1999]:	  18	  my	  translation).	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suppose	   that	   in	   his	   Cambridge	   lectures	   he	   distanced	   himself	   from	   his	   previous	   claim	  
about	  a	  relation	  between	  art	  and	  beauty3.	  
I	  would	  like	  to	  sketch	  a	  different	  picture,	  and	  try	  to	  highlight	  an	  element	  of	  continuity	  
in	  Wittgenstein’s	  views	  on	  art	  and	  beauty	  amid	  the	  profound	  changes	  his	  philosophical	  
conceptions	  underwent.	  Roughly	  said,	  what	  explains	  this	  continuity	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  Witt-­‐
genstein’s	  ideas	  on	  art	  and	  beauty	  reflect	  more	  an	  attitude	  towards	  life	  than	  a	  theoreti-­‐
cal	  view,	  an	  attitude	  that	  presumably	  did	  not	  substantially	  change	   in	   later	  years,	  while	  
many	  of	  his	  early	  conceptions	  changed	  instead.	  
The	  paper	  is	  divided	  into	  five	  parts.	  In	  the	  first	  part	  I	  will	  comment	  on	  the	  Notebooks	  
entry	  and	  suggest	  that	   it	  expresses	  the	  young	  Wittgenstein’s	   ideas	  on	  the	  value	  of	  art,	  
while	  –	  as	  we	  will	  see	   in	  the	  third	  part	  –	  the	  view	  presented	   in	  the	  Lectures	  addresses	  
the	  question	  of	  aesthetic	  appreciation.	  In	  the	  second	  part	  there	  is	  an	  excursus	  on	  Dutch	  
painting.	  In	  the	  fourth	  part	  I	  will	  say	  something	  on	  the	  possibility	  that	  Wittgenstein	  had	  
acknowledged	  the	  historical	  character	  of	  a	  certain	  conception	  of	  beauty,	  and	  in	  this	  way	  
I	  hope	  to	  offer	  a	  context	  for	  understanding	  his	  observation	  on	  the	  mischief	  done	  by	  the	  
concept	  of	  “the	  beautiful”.	  Finally,	   in	   the	  fifth	  part	   I	  will	   try	   to	  show	  that	  Wittgenstein	  
saves	  a	  sense	  for	  talking	  about	  beauty	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  experience	  of	  art.	  
1.	  The	  Beautiful	  as	  the	  End	  of	  Art	  
The	  Notebooks	  observation	  that	  I	  quoted	  belongs	  to	  a	  series	  of	  intriguing	  reflections	  on	  
God,	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  world	  or	  of	  life,	  happiness,	  sin,	  ethics	  and	  aesthetics	  that	  Witt-­‐
genstein	  wrote	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  1916.	  They	  offer	  a	  framework	  for	  the	  interpretation	  
of	  the	  entry	  on	  beauty	  as	  the	  aim	  of	  art.	  Among	  them,	  very	   important	  are	  a	  couple	  of	  
remarks	  on	  art	  to	  which	  that	  entry	   is	  directly	  connected.	  A	  note	  on	  art	  and	  ethics	  that	  
Wittgenstein	   wrote	   a	   couple	   of	   weeks	   before	   the	   one	   on	   beauty	   has	   a	   crucial	   im-­‐
portance:	  «The	  work	  of	  art	  is	  the	  object	  seen	  sub	  specie	  aeternitatis;	  and	  the	  good	  life	  is	  
the	  world	  seen	  sub	  specie	  aeternitatis.	  This	   is	   the	  connection	  between	  art	  and	  ethics»	  
(NB,	  7.10.16).	  
While	  art	  is	  commonly	  thought	  of	  as	  a	  practice,	  the	  note	  suggests	  that	  it	  is	  a	  way	  of	  
seeing.	   It	  reflects	  young	  Wittgenstein’s	  Schopenhauerian	  conception	  of	  art	  as	  a	  way	  of	  
looking	   at	   things.	   It	   is	   presumably	   from	   Schopenhauer,	  who	   used	   it	   in	   relation	   to	   art,	  
 
3	  This	  is	  how,	  e.g.	  Stefan	  Majetschak	  (2007):	  92-­‐93,	  134-­‐141	  interprets	  the	  above	  passages.	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that	  Wittgenstein	  borrowed	  the	  Spinozian	  expression	  «sub	  specie	  aeternitatis»	  to	  char-­‐
acterize	  the	  way	  art	  looks	  at	  things.	  No	  less	  idiosyncratic	  is	  his	  conception	  of	  ethics.	  Eth-­‐
ics	  is	  usually	  thought	  of	  as	  a	  normative	  discipline.	  However,	  Wittgenstein	  seems	  to	  con-­‐
sider	   it	  an	  attitude	  instead.	  Accordingly,	  art	  does	  not	  result	  primarily	   in	  the	  creation	  of	  
an	  object	  of	  some	  kind,	  nor	  ethics	  in	  setting	  norms	  or	  in	  particular	  decisions	  or	  courses	  
of	   action	   in	   keeping	   with	   them;	   rather,	   they	   both	   appear	   to	   transform	   a	   pre-­‐existing	  
item	   into	  something	  different	  and	   this	  not	  by	  altering	   it,	  but	   in	  virtue	  of	   the	  way	   they	  
consider	  it.	  Whichever	  the	  precise	  nature	  of	  the	  view	  «sub	  specie	  aeternitatis»,	  accord-­‐
ing	   to	  Wittgenstein	   this	   way	   of	   looking	   has	   a	   transforming	   effect:	   in	   the	   case	   of	   art,	  
when	  it	  is	  seen	  «sub	  specie	  aeternitatis»	  a	  particular	  object	  is	  transformed	  into	  a	  work	  of	  
art;	   as	   for	   ethics,	   it	   is	   interesting	   that	   the	   transformation	   concerns	   our	   situation	   as	   a	  
whole.	   In	  Wittgenstein’s	   words	   it	   is	   the	   world,	   that	   is,	   life	   (TLP,	   5.621)	   that	   is	   trans-­‐
formed	  into	  the	  good	  life	  by	  the	  way	  it	  is	  looked	  at.	  
I	  will	  come	  back	  in	  a	  moment	  to	  this	  parallelism.	  As	  for	  now	  let	  me	  focus	  on	  art.	  The	  
conception	  that,	  since	  art	   is	  an	  attitude,	  more	  than	  an	  activity,	  what	  an	  artist	   first	  and	  
foremost	  provides	  is	  a	  transforming	  way	  of	  viewing,	  is	  confirmed	  in	  a	  note	  of	  1930	  from	  
Culture	  and	  Value.	   The	  note	   also	  helps	   to	   characterize	   the	   transformation	   that	   occurs	  
through	  art.	  Wittgenstein	  writes	  that	  the	  work	  of	  art	  compels	  us	  to	  see	  an	  object	  in	  the	  
right	  perspective,	  while	  «in	   the	  absence	  of	  art,	   the	  object	   is	   just	  a	   fragment	  of	  nature	  
like	  any	  other»	  (CV,	  4e).	  To	  be	  a	  piece	  of	  nature,	  that	  is	  a	  part	  of	  the	  world,	  means	  to	  be	  
an	  element	  of	  what	  the	  Tractatus	  called	  the	  how	  of	  the	  world,	  an	  element	  of	  the	  acci-­‐
dental	   «Geschehen	   und	   So-­‐sein»,	   where,	   according	   to	  Wittgenstein,	   there	   is	   no	   value	  
(cfr.	  TLP,	  6.41).	  Then	  what	  Wittgenstein	  is	  suggesting	  is	  that	  art	  can	  turn	  an	  object	  that	  is	  
a	  mere	  piece	  of	  nature	  into	  something	  of	  value,	  into	  an	  object	  that	  is	  worth	  contemplat-­‐
ing.	  He	  seems	  to	  echo	  a	  thought	  by	  Schopenhauer.	  In	  The	  World	  as	  Will	  and	  Representa-­‐
tion	  (18181,	  18442)	  Schopenhauer	  writes:	  «Art	  […]	  plucks	  the	  object	  of	  its	  contemplation	  
from	   the	   stream	   of	   the	  world’s	   course,	   and	   holds	   it	   isolated	   before	   it.	   This	   particular	  
thing,	  which	  in	  the	  stream	  was	  an	  infinitesimal	  part,	  becomes	  for	  art	  a	  representative	  of	  
the	  whole	  […]».	  (Schopenhauer	  [18181,	  18442],	  Book	  3,	  sec.	  36,	  vol.	  I,	  185)	  
Wittgenstein	  expresses	  a	  similar	  point	  by	  saying	  that	  a	  thing	  that	  as	  one	  among	  the	  
many	   things	   in	   the	  world	  was	   insignificant,	  when	  contemplated	  becomes	   the	  world	  of	  
the	  observer	  and	  as	  such	  significant	  (cfr.	  NB,	  8.10.16).	  A	  characteristic	  of	  the	  artistic	  way	  
of	  seeing	  is	  absorption	  in	  the	  object:	  it	  is	  not	  a	  way	  of	  seeing	  that	  considers	  both	  the	  ob-­‐
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ject	  and	  the	  relationships	  it	  has	  with	  other	  objects;	  rather	  it	  is	  a	  way	  of	  seeing	  in	  which	  
the	   observer	   is	   absorbed	   by	   the	   object	   so	   that	   the	   object	   becomes	   her	   world4.	   Inci-­‐
dentally,	  we	  can	  observe	  that	  this	  fact	  underlines	  the	  imaginative	  character	  of	  artistic	  vi-­‐
sion.	  Visual	  perception	  is	  necessarily	  multiple,	  while	  imagery	  «can	  detach	  an	  object	  from	  
its	  surrounding	  and	  posit	  it	  alone»:	  it	  is	  selective,	  abstracting,	  and	  this	  capacity	  is	  an	  as-­‐
pect	  of	  its	  inherent	  creativity	  (Cfr.	  McGinn	  [2004]:	  23-­‐24).	  Going	  back	  to	  Wittgenstein’s	  
suggestion,	  to	  understand	  why	  this	  way	  of	  seeing	  makes	  the	  object	  significant,	  at	   least	  
two	  other	  elements	  of	  his	  conception	  should	  be	  recalled.	  
The	  first	  element	  is	  the	  enigmatic	  observation	  that	  «aesthetically,	  the	  miracle	  is	  that	  
the	  world	  exists.	  That	  there	   is	  what	  there	   is»	  (NB,	  20.10.16).	  The	  German	  text	  sounds:	  
«Das	  künstlerische	  Wunder	  ist,	  daß	  es	  die	  Welt	  gibt.	  Daß	  es	  gibt,	  was	  es	  gibt».	  This	  sug-­‐
gests	  that	  the	  miracle	  in	  question	  is	  in	  some	  sense	  worked	  by	  art.	  However,	  we	  could	  al-­‐
so	   translate	   “Wunder”	  with	   “wonder”,	   and	   recall	   that	   in	   the	   Lecture	   on	   Ethics	   (1929-­‐
1930),	  to	  express	  what	  he	  means	  by	  “absolute	  value”,	  Wittgenstein	  mentions	  the	  expe-­‐
rience	  of	  wondering	  at	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  world	  (cfr.	  LE,	  8).	  As	  a	  response	  to	  the	  world,	  
wonder	  is	  a	  sort	  of	  affective	  grasping	  of	  the	  non-­‐accidentality	  of	  the	  being	  of	  what	  there	  
is,	  a	  way	  of	  feeling	  its	  non-­‐accidentality.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  a	  way	  of	  experiencing	  value	  and	  
sense.	  Going	  back	  to	  art,	  we	  could	  say	  that	  the	  miracle	  worked	  by	  art	   is	  to	  force	  us	  to	  
look	  at	  things,	  or	  at	  the	  world,	  with	  a	  sense	  of	  wonder	  at	  their	  existence.	  As	  we	  will	  see,	  
also	  in	  later	  years	  Wittgenstein	  connects	  the	  basis	  of	  art	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  wonder.	  It	  is	  
interesting	  that	  the	  miracle	  or	  the	  wonder	  of	  art	  does	  not	  have	  anything	  to	  do	  with	  the	  
facts	  being	   in	  any	  particular	  way,	  but	   it	   simply	  has	   to	  do	  with	  «their	  being	  some	  way»	  
(Morris	  [2008]:	  328).	  This	  involves	  taking	  the	  difference	  created	  by	  art	  to	  be	  a	  matter	  of	  
how	  the	  same	  thing	  seems	  to	  an	  observer.	  When	  Wittgenstein	  says	  that	  «in	  absence	  of	  
art,	   the	  object	   is	   just	   a	   fragment	  of	  nature	   like	  any	  other»,	  what	  he	  means	   is	   that	   art	  
makes	  an	  experience	  of	  value	  possible.	  
This	  brings	  us	  to	  the	  second	  element	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  conception	  that	  I	  would	  like	  to	  
recall.	  In	  the	  lines	  that	  follow	  the	  one	  on	  the	  artistic	  miracle,	  Wittgenstein	  asks	  rhetori-­‐
cally:	  «Is	  it	  the	  essence	  of	  the	  artistic	  way	  of	  looking	  at	  things,	  that	  it	  looks	  at	  the	  world	  
 
4	  While	  the	  ordinary	  way	  of	  seeing	  considers	  the	  facts	  being	  one	  specific	  way	  rather	  than	  anoth-­‐
er,	   «the	   thing	   seen	   sub	   specie	   aeternitatis	   is	   the	   thing	   seen	   together	   with	   the	   whole	   logical	  
space»	   (NB,	   7.10.16),	   that	   is,	   seen	   «with	   a	   consciousness	   […]	   of	   the	  way	   in	  which»	   it	   «can	   be	  
combined	  with	  other	  things»	  (Morris	  [2008]:	  326).	  Combinations	  of	  objects	  are	  facts,	  and	  facts	  in	  
logical	  space	  are	  the	  world.	  When	  a	  thing	  is	  contemplated	  together	  with	  the	  whole	  logical	  space,	  
or	  as	  capable	  of	  shaping	  the	  logical	  space,	  it	  becomes	  the	  world	  of	  the	  observer.	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with	  a	  happy	  eye?».	  And	  he	  answers	  quoting	  Schiller:	  «Life	   is	   serious,	   art	   is	   gay»	   (NB,	  
20.10.16).	  The	  quote	  comes	  from	  the	  Prologue	  of	  Wallenstein,	  a	  drama	  set	  in	  the	  middle	  
of	  the	  havoc,	  the	  robberies,	  the	  misery	  of	  the	  Thirty	  Years’	  War.	  It	  reminds	  us	  that	  the	  
serenity	  of	  art	  is	  not	  to	  be	  found	  in	  what	  it	  presents,	  but	  rather	  «in	  how	  it	  is	  presented»	  
(Wilde	  [2004]:	  173)5.	  Beside	  joy	  art	  can	  embrace	  sorrow	  and	  the	  tragic	  dimension	  of	  life	  
and	  its	  beauty	  does	  not	  depend	  on	  the	  subject	  but	  is	  connected	  to	  language.	  
It	  is	  intriguing	  that	  the	  Notebooks	  entry	  on	  beauty	  as	  the	  end	  of	  art	  follows	  immedi-­‐
ately	  after	  Schiller’s	  quote,	  and	  that	  Wittgenstein	  comments	  on	   it	  by	  saying:	  «And	  the	  
beautiful	  is	  what	  makes	  happy»	  (NB,	  29.10.16).	  According	  to	  other	  remarks	  in	  the	  Note-­‐
books,	  Wittgenstein	  thought	  that	  «in	  order	  to	  live	  happily»	  one	  «must	  be	  in	  agreement	  
with	  the	  world».	  He	  states	  that	  being	  in	  agreement	  with	  the	  world	  «is	  what	  “being	  hap-­‐
py”	  means»,	  and	  that	  «only	  a	  men	  who	   lives	  not	   in	  time	  but	   in	  the	  present	   is	  happy».	  
“Living	  in	  the	  present”	  means	  living	  eternally,	  since	  Wittgenstein	  understands	  by	  “eter-­‐
nity”	  «not	  infinite	  temporal	  duration	  but	  non-­‐temporality»	  (NB,	  8.7.16).	  With	  these	  be-­‐
ing	  the	  characteristics	  of	  happiness,	  we	  understand	  why	  the	  artistic	  eye	  is	  a	  happy	  eye.	  
It	   looks	  at	  the	  world	  sub	  specie	  aeternitatis,	  that	  is,	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  a	  person	  
who	  lives	  in	  the	  present,	  and	  this	  way	  of	  seeing	  is	  presumably	  what	  good	  art	  expresses	  
(cfr.	  NB,	  19.9.16).	  However,	  one	  could	  object	  that	  the	  detachment	  expressed	  in	  the	  idea	  
of	  a	  vision	  sub	  specie	  aeternitatis	   is	  only	  the	  negative	  condition	  for	  being	  in	  agreement	  
with	   the	  world.	   Living	   in	   the	   present	   certainly	  means	   living	  without	   desires,	   hopes	   or	  
fears	  that	  project	  into	  the	  future	  and	  connect	  to	  the	  past.	  However,	  what	  follows	  from	  
this	  detachment	   is	   renunciation,	  not	  yet	  happiness.	  What	   is	   then	  the	  point	  of	  being	   in	  
agreement	  with	  the	  world?	  
Wittgenstein	   notices	   that	   we	   approach	   the	   world	   as	   something	   «that	   is	   already	  
there»	   and	   this	   is	  why	  we	  have	   the	   feeling	   of	   being	   dependent	   on	   it	   as	   fate	   (cfr.	  NB,	  
8.7.16).	   In	  order	   to	   live	  happily	  one	  has	   to	  overcome	  this	   feeling	  of	  dependence.	  Near	  
the	   end	   of	   his	   Letters	   on	   the	   Aesthetic	   Education	   of	   Man	   (1795)	   Schiller	   writes	   that	  
«beauty	  alone	  confers	  happiness	  on	  all,	  and	  under	  its	  influence	  every	  being	  forgets	  that	  
he	  is	  limited»	  (letter	  27).	  I	  like	  to	  think	  that	  Wittgenstein,	  by	  quoting	  Schiller’s	  lines,	  was	  
hinting	  at	  the	  idea	  that	  beauty	  makes	  us	  happy	  since	  it	  helps	  us	  to	  overcome	  the	  sense	  
 
5	  An	  aphorism	  by	  Karl	  Kraus	  states:	  «Liebe	  und	  Kunst	  umarmen	  nicht,	  was	  schön	  ist,	  sondern	  was	  
eben	  dadurch	  schön	  wird»	  (http://gutenberg.spiegel.de/buch/4692/2).	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of	   necessity,	   of	   constraint,	   that	   characterizes	   our	   relation	   to	   the	   world6.	   He	   appears	  
even	  more	   radical	   than	   Schiller,	   because,	  while	   for	   Schiller	   the	   «joyous	   realm»	   of	   the	  
appearance	  and	  of	  art	   is	  the	  realm	  of	   imagination,	  for	  him	  it	   is	  our	  world	  that	   is	  trans-­‐
formed,	   if	   only	  we	   look	   artistically	   at	   it,	   that	   is,	   if	   only	  we	   see	   as	   a	  miracle	   the	   being	  
there	  of	  what	  there	  is.	  This	  is	  the	  miracle	  of	  art,	  and	  I	  suggest	  that	  by	  stating	  that	  there	  
is	  certainly	  something	  in	  the	  conception	  that	  the	  beautiful	  –	  that	  which	  makes	  happy	  –	  is	  
the	  aim	  of	  art,	  Wittgenstein	  is	  probably	  hinting	  at	  this	  miracle.	  
Good	  art,	  i.e.	  art	  that	  expresses	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  artist	  saw	  the	  (represented)	  ob-­‐
ject	   (cfr.	   NB,	   19.09.16),	   offers	   us	   moments	   of	   grace	   in	   which	   the	   significance	   of	   the	  
world,	  that	  is,	  of	  life,	  is	  revealed	  (Cfr.	  Budd	  [2011]:	  775-­‐776).	  
However,	  I	  do	  not	  think	  we	  should	  read	  Wittgenstein’s	  notes	  as	  a	  sketch	  of	  a	  theory	  
of	  art;	  anyway,	  if	  they	  were,	  it	  would	  not	  be	  a	  good	  theory	  of	  art,	  although	  they	  proba-­‐
bly	  catch	  the	  point	  of	  some	  art	  and	  the	  reason	  why	  it	  has	  value	  for	  us.	  As	  I	  read	  them,	  
they	  express	  a	  point	  of	  view	  on	  value.	  Wittgenstein	  seems	  to	  have	  thought	  that	  sense	  
and	  value	  are	  packed	  together	  in	  the	  experience	  of	  wondering	  or	  when	  the	  presence	  (or	  
presentness)	  of	  things	  is	  felt	  more	  intensely	  as	  our	  world.	  When	  he	  speaks	  of	  the	  artistic	  
miracle	  he	  is	  hinting	  at	  a	  way	  of	  seeing	  that	  can	  be	  characterized	  as	  the	  perception	  filled	  
with	  wonder	  of	  the	  presence	  (or	  presentness)	  of	  things,	  as	  if	  art	  embodied	  the	  possibil-­‐
ity	  of	   illuminating	  the	  world	  with	  meaning	  and	  value	  or	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  happy	   life7.	  
 
6	  What,	  according	   to	  Schiller,	   frees	  us	   from	  the	  seriousness	  of	   reality	   is	  a	  condition	   that	  he	  de-­‐
scribes	  using	  the	  world	  “play”.	  Now,	  nothing	  of	  what	  Schiller	  summarizes	  with	  the	  term	  “duty”	  
and	  “destiny”	  ceases	  to	  exist	  (Schiller,	  letter	  15).	  Rather,	  what	  characterizes	  the	  condition	  of	  play	  
is	   that	   the	  element	  of	  constraint	  present	   in	  our	  needs	  and	  duties	   is	  overcome,	   is	  made	  contin-­‐
gent.	  However,	  together	  with	  necessity	  is	  also	  contingency	  that	  is	  overcome.	  Therefore,	  Schiller	  
maintains	  that	  when	  a	  human	  being	  is	  in	  the	  condition	  of	  play,	  she	  is	  really	  free,	  that	  is,	  she	  real-­‐
izes	  her	  destination	  (cfr.	  Schiller,	  letter	  14).	  According	  to	  him,	  it	  is	  art	  and	  beauty	  that	  bring	  the	  
human	  being	  to	  this	  condition	  where	  the	  capacities	  of	  thinking	  and	  acting	  can	  flourish.	  For	  Schil-­‐
ler,	  what	  art	  delivers	   is	  a	  sense	  of	  our	  destination.	  Maybe	  I	  am	  reading	  too	  much	  into	  Wittgen-­‐
stein’s	  quote	  from	  Schiller,	  but	   it	   is	  tempting	  to	  think	  that	  Wittgenstein	  was	  familiar	  with	  these	  
ideas.	  
7	  That	  “beauty”	  as	  well	  as	  “good”	  is	  a	  term	  for	  what	  is	  of	  value	  is	  confirmed	  by	  the	  thesis	  of	  the	  
Tractatus	  that	  «ethics	  and	  aesthetics	  are	  one»	  (TLP,	  6.421)	  and	  also	  by	  what	  we	  read	  at	  the	  be-­‐
ginning	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  Lecture	  on	  ethics:	  «I’m	  going	  to	  use	  the	  term	  Ethics	  […]	  in	  a	  sense	  […]	  
which	  includes	  what	  I	  believe	  to	  be	  the	  most	  essential	  part	  of	  what	  is	  generally	  called	  Aesthetics.	  
[…]	  Now	  instead	  of	  saying	  “Ethics	  is	  the	  enquiry	  into	  what	  is	  good”	  I	  could	  have	  said	  that	  Ethics	  is	  
the	  enquiry	  into	  what	  is	  valuable,	  or,	  into	  what	  is	  really	  important,	  or	  I	  could	  have	  said	  Ethics	  is	  
the	  enquiry	  into	  the	  meaning	  of	  life,	  or	  into	  what	  makes	  life	  worth	  living,	  or	  into	  the	  right	  way	  of	  
living»	  (LE,	  4-­‐5).	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The	  beautiful	  as	  the	  end	  of	  art	  is	  nothing	  other	  than	  the	  world	  seen	  sub	  specie	  aeternita-­‐
tis.	  Since	   for	  Wittgenstein	  “being	  happy”	  means	  being	   in	  agreement	  with	  the	  world	  or	  
living	  in	  the	  present,	  we	  can	  understand	  why	  he	  thinks	  that	  the	  beautiful	  is	  what	  makes	  
happy.	  Do	  we	  really	   find	  a	  different	  picture	  when	  we	  move	  to	  the	  writings	  of	  his	   later	  
years?	  As	  for	  the	  lectures	  from	  the	  1930s,	  the	  fact	  that	  Wittgenstein	  mainly	  focuses	  his	  
attention	  on	   the	   adjective	   “beautiful”	   instead	  of	   on	   its	   use	   as	   a	   noun	  or	   on	   the	  noun	  
“beauty”	  should	  make	  us	  doubt.	  Before	  turning	  to	  those	  texts,	  I	  will	  briefly	  expand	  on	  a	  
passage	  of	   the	   early	   1930s,	  which	   I	   have	   already	  partially	   quoted.	   It	   is	   a	   passage	   that	  
signals	  the	  existence	  of	  continuities	  between	  Wittgenstein’s	  earlier	  and	  later	  conception	  
of	  the	  aim	  and	  value	  of	  art8.	  
2.	  Excursus:	  Wittgenstein	  and	  Dutch	  Painting	  
In	  the	  note	  from	  Culture	  and	  Value	  Wittgenstein	  recalls	  a	  conversation	  between	  him	  and	  
his	   friend	   Paul	   Engelmann	   when	   Engelmann	   said	   that	   when	   he,	   at	   home,	   looks	   at	   a	  
drawer	   full	  of	  his	  manuscripts,	   they	  appear	   to	  him	  valuable	  and	  worth	  publishing;	  but	  
when	  he	  considers	  publishing	  a	  selection	  of	   them	  «the	  whole	  business	   loses	   its	  charm	  
and	  value».	  To	  help	  his	  friend	  understanding	  this	  strange	  experience,	  Wittgenstein	  sug-­‐
gests	   him	   a	   comparison:	   «I	   said	   that	   it	   was	   like	   the	   following	   case:	   Nothing	   could	   be	  
more	   remarkable	   than	   seeing	   a	   man	   who	   thinks	   he	   is	   unobserved	   performing	   some	  
quite	  simple	  everyday	  activity».	  He	  then	  suggests	  a	  kind	  of	  thought	  experiment:	  
Let	  us	  imagine	  a	  theatre;	  the	  curtain	  goes	  up	  and	  we	  see	  a	  man	  alone	  in	  a	  room,	  walking	  up	  
and	  down,	  lighting	  a	  cigarette,	  sitting	  down,	  etc.	  so	  that	  suddenly	  we	  are	  observing	  a	  human	  
being	  from	  outside	  in	  a	  way	  that	  ordinarily	  we	  can	  never	  observe	  ourselves;	  it	  would	  be	  like	  
watching	  a	  chapter	  of	  a	  biography	  with	  our	  own	  eyes,	  –	  surely	  this	  would	  be	  uncanny	  and	  
wonderful	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  We	  should	  be	  observing	  something	  more	  wonderful	  than	  any-­‐
thing	  a	  playwright	  could	  arrange	  to	  be	  acted	  or	  spoken	  on	  the	  stage:	  life	  itself.	  (CV,	  4e)	  
In	  a	   sense	   the	   theatrical	   situation	  gives	   structure	   to	   the	   former	  case	  and	  Wittgenstein	  
focuses	  his	  attention	  on	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  vision	  from	  the	  outside,	  from	  a	  detached	  point	  
of	   view:	   an	   ordinary	   scene	   becomes	   extraordinary,	   remarkable.	  He	   thus	   suggests	   that	  
the	  way	  we	  look	  at	  things	  can	  have	  a	  sort	  of	  power	  of	  transformation.	  It	  is	  the	  power	  he	  
talked	  about	  in	  the	  Notebooks	  entry	  of	  8.10.16	  and	  illustrated	  with	  the	  stove-­‐example,	  
suggesting	  that	  the	  everyday	  can	  become	  a	  domain	  for	  the	  aesthetic:	  something	  familiar	  
 
8	  On	  continuities	  and	  changes	  in	  Wittgenstein’s	  conception	  of	  art	  see	  now	  Wilke	  (2012).	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becomes	  wonderful.	  Now,	  it	  is	  interesting	  that	  in	  the	  note	  of	  1930,	  Wittgenstein	  not	  on-­‐
ly	  claims	  that	  «only	  the	  artist	  can	  so	  represent	  the	  individual	  so	  that	  it	  appears	  to	  us	  as	  a	  
work	  of	  art»,	  recalling	  the	  Notebooks	  entry	  of	  7.10.16,	  but	  also	  maintains	  that	  a	  work	  of	  
art	  «forces	  us	  –	  as	  one	  might	  say	  –	  to	  see	  it	  in	  the	  right	  perspective»	  (CV,	  4e),	  that	  is,	  it	  
makes	  us	  capable	  of	  wondering	  at	   the	  existence	  of	  what	  there	   is.	  The	  theatre	  thought	  
experiment	   adumbrated	   in	   the	   note	   suggests	   that	   art	   offers	   a	   kind	   of	   space	   where	  
something	  –	  an	  object,	  a	  situation,	  a	  character,	  etc.	  –	  comes	  to	  presence	  or,	  better	  per-­‐
haps,	   where	   presence	   (or	   presentness)	   is	   felt	   more	   intensely.	   Sense	   and	   value	   are	  
packed	  together	  in	  this	  experience	  for	  Wittgenstein,	  it	  seems.	  
There	  are	  certain	  artworks	  that	  can	  be	  considered	  an	  exemplification	  of	  this	  concep-­‐
tion.	  Photography	  offers	  many	  examples.	  Works	  like	  the	  photographs	  of	  industrial	  struc-­‐
tures	  by	  Bernd	  and	  Hilla	  Becher,	  the	  landscapes	  photographs	  by	  Robert	  Adams,	  or	  city-­‐
scapes	  by	  Alfred	  Stieglitz,	  Walker	  Evans	  and	  Paul	  Strand	  seem	  to	  allow	  for	  a	  way	  of	  see-­‐
ing	   that	   transcends	   the	   limits	   of	   individual	   perspective	   in	   the	   sense	   intended	  by	  Witt-­‐
genstein.	  One	  could	  also	  think	  of	  works	  by	  contemporary	  photographers	  like	  Clare	  Rich-­‐
ardson,	  or	  by	  Jeff	  Wall.	  Above	  all	  Wall’s	  Morning	  cleaning	  (1999)	  could	  be	  interpreted	  as	  
embodying	  a	  way	  of	   looking	  at	  things	  akin	  to	  the	  one	  Wittgenstein	  hints	  at9.	  However,	  
maybe	   it	   is	   in	  XVII	   century	  Dutch	  painting	   that	  we	   find	  an	  attitude	   towards	   the	  world	  
which	  is	  very	  similar	  to	  what	  Wittgenstein	  considers	  the	  artistic	  way	  of	  seeing.	  Consider	  
paintings	  such	  as	  The	  Courtyard	  of	  a	  House	  in	  Delft	  (1658)	  by	  Pieter	  De	  Hooch,	  Woman	  
Reading	   (late	   1660s)	   by	   Pieter	   Janssens	   Elinga,	  Woman	   peeling	   apples	   by	   Gerard	   Ter	  
Borch	  (ca.	  1660),	  or	  Johannes	  Vermeer’s	  The	  Lacemaker	  (1669-­‐70).	  Without	  getting	  into	  
interpretative	  details,	   I	   suggest	   that	   those	  artists,	  by	  depicting	   the	  most	  commonplace	  
scenes	  with	   the	   greatest	   accuracy	   and	   skill,	   so	   that	   they	   look	   stunning	   and	   beautiful,	  
make	  us	  acknowledge	  that	  even	  the	  least	  interesting	  objects	  can	  be	  seen	  –	  and	  depicted	  
–	   as	   immensely	   valuable.	   Through	   their	   works	   they	   have	   shown	   that	   beauty	   can	   be	  
found	  in	  the	  most	  meaningless	  objects,	  in	  the	  most	  obvious	  gesture	  and	  ordinary	  scene.	  
But	  what	  makes	  beauty	  appear	  is	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  (artist’s)	  gaze.	  It	  is	  actually	  the	  gaze	  
of	  the	  painter	  that	  by	  means	  of	  selecting	  an	  object	  or	  a	  scene	  from	  the	  world	  and	  trans-­‐
forming	   it,	   puts	  us	   in	   contact	  with	  beauty	   (cfr.	   Todorov	   [2000]:	   88)10.	   Furthermore,	   as	  
 
9	  Michael	  Fried	  conjoins	   it	   to	   the	   just	   recalled	  note	   from	  Culture	  and	  Value	   in	  a	   revelatory	  and	  
suggestive	  way	  (cfr.	  Fried	  [2008]:	  63-­‐93).	  
10	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  according	  to	  Wittgenstein	  art	  compels	  us	  to	  the	  right	  perspective.	  How	  it	  can	  
“force”	  us	  is	  an	  interesting	  question	  that	  I	  cannot	  pursue	  here.	  However,	  as	  for	  Dutch	  painting,	  it	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Tzvetan	  Todorov	  notices,	  there	  is	  a	  sense	  of	  suspension	  of	  time	  in	  De	  Hooch	  as	  well	  as	  in	  
Ter	  Borch	  and	  Vermeer	  that	  suggests	  a	  (Spinozian)	  vision	  sub	  specie	  aeterni,	  so	  that	  the	  
transient	  is	  captured	  and	  becomes	  eternal.	  The	  depicted	  scenes	  are	  taken	  from	  ordinary	  
life	  –	  a	  lady	  writing	  a	  letter,	  a	  woman	  peeling	  apples,	  people	  drinking	  in	  a	  courtyard,	  etc.	  
–,	  but	  the	  subjects	  look	  as	  if	  they	  did	  not	  belong	  to	  the	  scene	  anymore.	  Once	  again,	  this	  
is	   the	  effect	  of	   the	  painter’s	  gaze,	  a	  gaze	   full	  of	  grace	   that	   rejoices	   in	   the	  existence	  of	  
things,	  that	  transforms	  life	  illuminating	  it	  with	  meaning	  and	  beauty	  (cfr.	  Todorov	  [2000]:	  
116	  ).	   It	   is,	   I	  believe,	  the	  same	  grace	  Wittgenstein	  evokes	  while	  speaking	  of	  art	  as	  of	  a	  
way	   of	   looking	   at	   things	   sub	   specie	   aeterni	   or	   with	   a	   happy	   eye.	   Both	  Wittgenstein’s	  
stove	  example	  and	  the	  ordinary	  scene	  performed	  in	  a	  theatre	  conceived	  of	  in	  the	  note	  
from	  Culture	  and	  Value	  are,	  at	  least	  in	  spirit,	  near	  to	  the	  Dutch	  painterly	  experience	  that	  
beauty	  can	  be	  found	   in	  the	  most	  common	  and	  humble	  objects11.	   If	   I	  am	  not	  wrong,	   in	  
the	   early	   1930s	  Wittgenstein	   still	   thought	   that	   art	   can	  make	   the	   trivial	   significant	   and	  
that	  beauty	  –	  or	  the	  beauty	  of	  art	  –	  is	  one	  with	  an	  experience	  of	  meaning	  and	  value.	  Let	  
us	  now	  turn	  to	  the	  lectures	  from	  the	  1930s.	  
3.	  The	  (Alleged)	  Insignificance	  of	  “Beautiful”	  in	  Aesthetic	  Evaluation	  
No	  doubt	  also	  in	  regard	  to	  aesthetics	  a	  new	  landscape	  delineates	  from	  the	  Thirties	  on.	  
Aesthetics	  is	  no	  longer	  examined	  in	  its	  connection	  to	  ethics,	  and	  art	  in	  not	  approached	  
by	  Wittgenstein	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  vision.	  Maybe	  he	  put	  into	  practice	  his	  belief	  that,	  as	  a	  per-­‐
spective	  onto	  the	  world,	  art	  and	  aesthetics	  cannot	  be	  expressed	  (crf.	  TLP,	  6.421).	  Be	  that	  
as	   it	  may,	  when	  he	  now	  talks	  about	  aesthetics,	  he	  focuses	  more	  on	  contexts	  of	  artistic	  
 
seems	  possible	  to	  conjecture	  that	  the	  shifting	  of	  our	  attention	  from	  the	  scene	  represented,	  to	  its	  
quality	  of	  absorption	  –	  to	  use	  Fried’s	  notion	  –	  occurs	  not	  only	  because	  very	  often	  the	  depicted	  
subjects	  are	  themselves	  absorbed	  in	  their	  actions,	  but	  also	  because	  the	  painter	  appears	  to	  be	  ab-­‐
sorbed	   in	   them	  himself.	   His	   attentiveness	   and	   interest	   in	   the	   scene,	   the	  meticulousness,	   com-­‐
mitment	  and	  intensity	  with	  which	  he	  paints	  it,	  suggest	  the	  scene	  may	  deserve	  the	  beholder’s	  at-­‐
tention	  and	  makes	  significant	  what	  is	  in	  itself	  insignificant.	  	  
11	  As	  a	  reader	  of	  Schopenhauer,	  Wittgenstein	  could	  have	  had	  in	  mind	  a	  passage	  from	  section	  38	  
of	  book	  3	  of	  the	  World,	  where	  Schopenhauer	  hints	  at	  Dutch	  painting.	  Further,	  he	  may	  have	  found	  
in	   the	   following	   passage	   an	   attitude	   similar	   to	   the	   one	   exemplified	   by	   Dutch	   painting:	   «Every	  
state	  or	  condition,	  every	  person,	  every	  scene	  of	  life,	  needs	  to	  be	  apprehended	  only	  pure	  objec-­‐
tively,	  and	  made	  the	  object	  of	  a	  description	  or	  sketch,	  whether	  with	  brush	  or	  with	  words,	  in	  or-­‐
der	   to	  appear	   interesting,	  delightful,	  and	  enviable».	   (Schopenhauer	   [18181,	  18442]:	  371,	  Suppl.,	  
Book	  3,	  cap.	  30)	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production	  and	  evaluative	  practices,	   intertwined	  with	  other	  aspects	  of	  what	  he	  calls	  a	  
“form	   of	   life”,	   that	   is,	   the	   structured	   activities	   of	   groups	   of	   human	   agents12.	   A	   better	  
name	   for	  his	  Lectures	  on	  Aesthetics	  would	  have	  been	  “Lectures	  on	  criticism”13.	  He	  dis-­‐
cusses	  both	  ordinary	  practices	  such	  as	  the	  evaluation	  of	  the	  length	  of	  a	  suit	  (LA,	  I,	  13,	  5),	  
or	  of	  the	  height	  of	  a	  door	  and	  the	  aesthetic	   judgment	  of	  poems	  or	  of	  pieces	  of	  music,	  
apparently	  considering	  them	  on	  a	  par.	  Accordingly,	  he	  sees	  aesthetics	  connected	  to	  the	  
knowledge	  of	   a	   form	  of	   life,	   a	   culture,	   an	  epoch	  and	   its	   styles,	   rules	   and	   standards	  of	  
evaluation,	  and	  to	  the	  knowledge	  of	  the	  history	  of	  artefacts.	  
This	  comprehension	  of	  aesthetics	  being	  the	  background	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  discussion	  
of	  the	  word	  “beautiful”	  in	  lectures	  from	  the	  1930s,	  it	  is	  obvious	  that	  his	  considerations	  
concern	  essentially	  the	  use	  of	  the	  word	  in	  evaluative	  practices.	  They	  could	  be	  organized	  
according	  to	  two	  perspectives;	  although	  they	  are	  strictly	  connected,	  I	  will	  distinguish	  be-­‐
tween	  them	  and	  call	  one	  “the	  conceptual”,	  and	  the	  other	  “the	  developmental	  perspec-­‐
tive”.	  
(i)	  The	  conceptual	  perspective.	  Wittgenstein’s	  Lectures	  on	  Aesthetics	  begins	  with	  the	  
statement	   that	   the	   subject	   “Aesthetics”	   is	   «entirely	  misunderstood»,	   and	   the	   first	   ob-­‐
servation	   on	   the	   topic	   concerns	   the	   very	  word	   “beautiful”:	   «The	   use	   of	   such	  word	   as	  
“beautiful”	   is	   even	  more	  apt	   to	  be	  misunderstood	   if	   you	   look	  at	   the	   linguistic	   form	  of	  
sentences	   in	  which	   it	  occurs	   than	  most	  other	  words.	   ‘Beautiful’	   […]	   is	   an	  adjective,	   so	  
you	  are	  inclined	  to	  say:	  “This	  has	  a	  certain	  quality,	  that	  of	  being	  beautiful”»	  (LA,	  1,	  1).	  
Wittgenstein	   criticizes	   the	  misunderstanding	  of	   the	  word	   “beautiful”	   as	   a	  word	  de-­‐
noting	  a	  quality,	  something	  all	  beautiful	  things	  have	  in	  common14.	  Apparently	  it	  is	  intel-­‐
 
12	  Since	   our	   human	   form	   of	   life	   is	   essentially	   cultural,	  Wittgenstein	   usually	   connects	   aesthetic	  
practices	  also	  to	  the	  culture	  of	  a	  period.	  He	  states	  that	  «the	  words	  we	  call	  expressions	  of	  aesthet-­‐
ic	  judgment	  play	  a	  very	  complicated	  role,	  but	  a	  very	  definite	  role,	   in	  what	  we	  call	  a	  culture	  of	  a	  
period.	  To	  describe	  their	  use	  […]	  you	  have	  to	  describe	  a	  culture.	  […]	  What	  belongs	  to	  a	  language	  
game	  is	  a	  whole	  culture».	  (LA,	  I	  25-­‐26,	  8)	  
13	  I	  owe	  this	   suggestion	   to	  Mark	  Rowe.	  Needless	   to	  say,	  we	  are	  dealing	  with	  more	  or	   less	   frag-­‐
mentary	  notes,	   taken	  by	   students	  who	  attended	  Wittgenstein’s	   classes.	   Though	  many	  of	   these	  
notes	   record	   spontaneous	   remarks	   more	   than	   articulated	   opinions,	   they	   offer	   a	   clear	   idea	   of	  
Wittgenstein’s	  new	  approach	  to	  the	  topic	  “art	  and	  beauty”,	  when	  compared	  to	  the	  Notebook	  and	  
the	  Tractatus.	  
14	  In	   the	   Blue	   Book	   Wittgenstein	   speaks	   of	   our	   «craving	   for	   generality»	   and	   associates	   it	   to	  
tendencies	   connected	   with	   «particular	   philosophical	   confusions».	   He	   describes	   some	   of	   these	  
tendencies	   and	   it	   is	   interesting	   that	   the	   first	   one	   he	   names,	   that	   is	   the	   tendency	   «to	   look	   for	  
something	  in	  common	  to	  all	  the	  entities	  which	  we	  commonly	  subsume	  under	  a	  general	  term»,	  is	  
then	  exemplified	  with	  the	  term	  “beauty”	  among	  others:	  «The	  idea	  of	  a	  general	  concept	  being	  a	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ligible	   to	   say	   that	  beauty	   is	  a	  quality	  of	   things;	  but,	   if	   it	   is,	  how	  does	  one	  know	  that	  a	  
thing	  has	   this	  quality?	   In	  Alice	  Ambrose’s	  notes	   from	  Wittgenstein	   lectures	  of	  1932-­‐33	  
Wittgenstein	   is	   reported	   to	   have	   asked	   precisely	   this	   question.	   Take	   a	   face:	   is	   the	   ar-­‐
rangement	  of	  its	  colours,	  profile,	  contour	  of	  the	  brows,	  etc.	  what	  we	  mean	  by	  a	  beauti-­‐
ful	  face,	  or	  are	  these	  features	  only	  a	  symptom	  of	  beauty?	  Wittgenstein	  observes	  that	  in	  
order	  for	  something	  to	  be	  the	  symptom	  of	  something	  else,	  it	  should	  be	  possible	  to	  pur-­‐
sue	  an	   independent	   investigation	  of	   it.	  He	  makes	   the	   following	  example:	  «If	   I	  want	   to	  
know	  whether	  a	  rod	  is	  elastic	  I	  can	  find	  out	  by	  looking	  through	  a	  microscope	  to	  see	  the	  
arrangement	   of	   its	   particles,	   the	   nature	   of	   their	   arrangement	   being	   a	   symptom	   of	   its	  
elasticity,	   or	   inelasticity.	   Or	   I	   can	   test	   the	   rod	   empirically,	   e.g.,	   see	   how	   far	   it	   can	   be	  
pulled	   out».	   Now,	   while	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   arrangement	   of	   the	   particles	   is	   something	  
from	  which	  the	  rod	  elasticity	  can	  be	  concluded,	  and	  arguably	  is	  something	  that	  all	  elastic	  
rods	  have	  in	  common,	  it	  seems	  that	  a	  separate	  investigation	  is	  not	  possible	  in	  the	  case	  
of	  beauty.	  Rather,	  it	  is	  just	  «a	  certain	  arrangement	  of	  colors	  and	  shape»	  what	  we	  mean	  
by	  a	  beautiful	   face.	  But,	   if	  beauty	   is	   inherent	   in	  an	  arrangement	  of	  colours	  and	  shape,	  
then	  there	  is	  nothing	  that	  all	  beautiful	  faces	  have	  in	  common.	  Wittgenstein	  further	  no-­‐
tices	  that	  «no	  arrangement	   is	  beautiful	   in	   itself»	  and	  this	  helps	  him	  to	  make	  the	  more	  
general	  point	  that	  «the	  word	  “beauty”	  is	  used	  for	  a	  thousand	  different	  things.	  Beauty	  of	  
face	  is	  different	  from	  that	  of	  flowers	  and	  animals».	  
By	   arguing	   that	  what	  makes	   a	   thing	   beautiful	   –	   say	   a	   face	   –	  may	   differ	   from	  what	  
makes	   another	   thing	   –	   say	   a	   flower	   –	   beautiful,	  Wittgenstein	   is	   somehow	  making	   the	  
point	  that	  “beautiful”	  is	  most	  often	  used	  as	  an	  attributive	  rather	  than	  a	  predicative	  ad-­‐
jective	   (Cfr.	   also	  Budd	   [2011]:	  778).	  However,	   it	   is	   interesting	   that	  he	  corroborates	  his	  
belief,	  observing	  that	  “one	  is	  playing	  utterly	  different	  games”	  when	  discussing	  beauty	  of	  
face	   or	   beauty	   of	   flowers,	   etc.	   The	  word	   “beautiful”	   is	   «bound	   up»	  with	   the	  words	   it	  
modifies,	  and	  when	  applied	  to	  a	  face	  is	  not	  the	  same	  «as	  when	  applied	  to	  flowers	  and	  
trees.	  We	  have	  in	  the	  latter	  a	  similar	  ‘game’»	  (AWL,	  34-­‐36).	  A	  thought	  close	  to	  this	  ap-­‐
pears	   in	   a	   couple	   of	   remarks	   from	   Culture	   and	   Value	   coeval	   with	   Ambrose’s	   notes,	  
where	  the	  context	  is	  that	  of	  comparative	  judgments:	  
 
common	  property	  of	   its	  particular	   instances	  connects	  up	  with	  other	  primitive,	  too	  simple,	   ideas	  
of	  the	  structure	  of	  language.	  It	  is	  comparable	  to	  the	  ideas	  that	  properties	  are	   ingredients	  of	  the	  
things	  which	  have	  the	  properties;	  e.g.	  that	  beauty	  is	  an	  ingredient	  of	  all	  beautiful	  things	  as	  alco-­‐
hol	   is	  of	  beer	  and	  wine,	  and	   that	  we	   therefore	  could	  have	  pure	  beauty,	  unadulterated	  by	  any-­‐
thing	  that	  is	  beautiful».	  (BB,	  17)	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If	  someone	  says,	  let’s	  suppose,	  “A’s	  eyes	  have	  a	  more	  beautiful	  expression	  than	  B’s”,	  then	  I	  
should	  say	  that	  he	   is	  certainly	  not	  using	  the	  word	  “beautiful”	   to	  mean	  what	   is	  common	  to	  
everything	  we	  call	  beautiful.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  he	   is	  playing	  a	  game	  with	  the	  word	  that	  has	  
quite	  narrow	  bounds.	  But	  what	   shows	   this?	  Did	   I	   have	   in	  mind	   some	  particular,	   restricted	  
explanation	  of	   the	  word	  “beautiful”?	  Certainly	  not.	  –	  But	  perhaps	   I	   shall	  not	  even	   feel	   like	  
comparing	  the	  beauty	  of	  expression	  in	  a	  pair	  of	  eyes	  with	  the	  beauty	  in	  the	  shape	  of	  a	  nose.	  
So	  perhaps	  we	  might	   say:	   if	   there	  were	  a	   language	  with	   two	  words	  so	   that	   there	  were	  no	  
reference	  to	  anything	  common	  to	  such	  cases,	   I	   should	  have	  no	  trouble	  about	  using	  one	  of	  
these	  two	  special	  words	  for	  my	  case	  and	  my	  meaning	  would	  not	  be	  impoverished.	  
If	  I	  say	  A	  has	  beautiful	  eyes	  someone	  may	  ask	  me:	  what	  do	  you	  find	  beautiful	  about	  his	  eyes,	  
and	  perhaps	  I	  shall	  reply:	  the	  almond	  shape,	  long	  eye-­‐lashes,	  delicate	  lids.	  What	  do	  these	  eyes	  
have	  in	  common	  with	  a	  gothic	  church	  that	  I	  find	  beautiful	  too?	  Should	  I	  say	  they	  make	  a	  similar	  
impression	  on	  me?	  What	   if	   I	  were	   to	   say	   that	   in	  both	  cases	  my	  hand	   feels	   temped	   to	  draw	  
them?	  That	  at	  any	  rate	  would	  be	  a	  narrow	  definition	  of	  the	  beautiful.	  (CV,	  24e)	  
Wittgenstein	   then	   suggests	   that	   if	  we	   seek	  our	   reason	   for	   calling	   something	  beautiful,	  
the	  peculiar	  grammar	  of	  the	  word	   in	  a	  particular	   instance	  will	  be	  evident.	  These	  refer-­‐
ences	  to	  language	  games	  and	  grammar	  bring	  us	  to	  the	  second	  aspect	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  
strategy.	  He	  is	  reported	  to	  have	  said:	  «one	  thing	  we	  always	  do	  when	  discussing	  a	  word	  is	  
to	  ask	  how	  we	  were	  taught	  it.	  Doing	  this	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  destroys	  a	  variety	  of	  miscon-­‐
ceptions,	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  gives	  you	  a	  primitive	   language	  in	  which	  the	  word	  is	  used»	  
(LA,	  I,	  5,	  1).	  As	  we	  will	  now	  see,	  since	  Wittgenstein	  maintains	  that	  the	  occasion	  on	  which	  
“beautiful”	   is	   used,	   the	   «situation»	   in	  which	   it	   has	   a	   place	   can	  be	  highly	   complicated,	  
that	  we	  have	  a	  primitive	  language	  is	  of	  the	  greatest	  importance.	  
(ii)	  The	  developmental	   perspective.	   Both	   in	   the	   lectures	  of	   the	  early	   Thirties	   and	   in	  
those	   of	   1938	   Wittgenstein	   draws	   the	   attention	   of	   his	   audience	   to	   «how	   we	   learn»	  
words	   such	   as	   “beautiful”	   and	   “ugly”.	  According	   to	  Ambrose’s	   notes,	   he	   reiterates	  his	  
criticism	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  beauty	  as	  a	  common	  property	  by	  observing:	  «We	  do	  not	  as	  chil-­‐
dren	  discover	  the	  quality	  of	  beauty	  or	  ugliness	  in	  a	  face	  and	  find	  that	  these	  are	  qualities	  
that	  a	  tree	  has	  in	  common	  with	  it»	  (cfr.	  AWL,	  35-­‐36).	  In	  the	  lectures	  of	  1938	  he	  returns	  
to	  the	  children	  situation,	  focussing	  the	  attention	  on	  how	  a	  child	  learns	  the	  word	  “beauti-­‐
ful”.	  He	  is	  reported	  to	  have	  said	  that	  a	  child	  learns	  it	  as	  an	  interjection,	  that	  is,	  as	  an	  ex-­‐
pression	  logically	  on	  the	  same	  level	  as	  an	  “Oh!”	  or	  a	  smile,	  and	  that	  the	  word	  is	  taught	  
«as	  a	  substitute	  for	  a	  facial	  expression	  or	  a	  gesture»	  of	  approval	  (LA,	  5,	  2,	  2)15.	  
 
15	  What	  makes	  “beautiful”	  an	   interjection	  of	  approval,	  Wittgenstein	  notices,	  «is	  the	  game	  it	  ap-­‐
pears	  in»,	  the	  «occasion»	  on	  which	  it	  is	  said.	  He	  considers	  as	  the	  «main	  mistake»	  of	  the	  philoso-­‐
phers	   of	   his	   generation,	   that	  when	   they	   look	   at	   language,	   they	   look	   at	   the	   form	  of	   sentences.	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As	  we	  have	  seen,	  according	  to	  Wittgenstein	  asking	  how	  we	  were	  taught	  a	  word	  de-­‐
stroys	  a	  variety	  of	  misconceptions	  and	  gives	  us	  a	  primitive	  language	  in	  which	  the	  word	  is	  
used.	  The	  two	  things	  are	  connected.	  The	  word	  “primitive”	  has	  not	  necessarily	  a	  pejora-­‐
tive	  nuance.	  When	  he	   says	   that	  words	   such	  as	   “beautiful”	   are	  used	  as	   interjections	   in	  
«primitive	  languages»,	  he	  presumably	  means	  that	  they	  are	  used	  in	  this	  way	  in	  languages	  
less	  complex	  than	  our	  own.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  however,	  Wittgenstein	  seems	  to	  consider	  
a	  primitive	  language	  as	  a	  model	  to	  which	  our	  language	  could	  be	  compared16.	  Otherwise	  
it	  becomes	  difficult	   to	  understand	  why	  by	  asking	  how	  we	  were	   taught	  a	  word	  we	  can	  
destroy	  a	   variety	  of	  misconceptions.	   The	   case	  of	   “beautiful”	   is	   clear	  enough.	  As	   far	   as	  
the	  primitive	  language	  in	  which	  it	  is	  used	  as	  an	  interjection	  goes,	  problems	  about	  what	  
the	  word	  is	  about,	  what	  its	  real	  subject	  is,	  Wittgenstein	  says,	  «don’t	  come	  up	  at	  all»	  (LA,	  
I,	  7,	  3).	  It	  is	  obvious	  that,	  as	  such	  a	  substitute,	  “beautiful”	  cannot	  denote	  anything.	  
If,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  by	  inviting	  us	  to	  conjure	  up	  how	  we	  learn	  the	  word	  “beautiful”	  
Wittgenstein	  corrects	  our	  image	  that	  the	  words	  refers	  to	  a	  common	  quality,	  on	  the	  oth-­‐
er	  hand,	   the	  equation	  of	   the	  game	   in	  which	  the	  word	   is	  used	  as	  an	   interjection	  with	  a	  
primitive	  language	  suggests	  that	  further	  materials	  are	  needed	  to	  arrive	  to	  our	  language,	  
and	  to	  the	  much	  richer	  activities	  that	  are	  our	  aesthetic	  practices17.	  Presumably	  Wittgen-­‐
stein	  assumes	  that	  the	  practice	  of	  aesthetic	  evaluation	  has	  grown	  from	  primitive	  forms	  
of	   reaction,	   that	   is,	   from	   pre-­‐linguistic	   forms	   of	   reaction	   such	   as	   facial	   expressions	   or	  
 
«Language	  –	  he	  has	  reportedly	  said	  –	  is	  a	  characteristic	  part	  of	  a	  large	  group	  of	  activities»;	  there-­‐
fore,	  we	   should	   concentrate	   on	   the	   «enormously	   complicated	   situation	   in	  which	   the	   aesthetic	  
expression	  has	  a	  place».	  (LA,	  I,	  5,	  2,	  2)	  
16	  On	  the	  notion	  of	  primitive	  language	  see	  Schulte	  (2004).	  
17	  Wittgenstein	  writes	  in	  1937:	  «The	  origin	  &	  the	  primitive	  form	  of	  the	  language-­‐game	  is	  a	  reac-­‐
tion:	  only	  upon	  this	  can	  the	  more	  complicated	  forms	  grow»	  (CV,	  31e).	  It	  is	  worth	  quoting	  a	  pas-­‐
sage	  from	  the	  Blue	  Book	  (1933-­‐1934)	  in	  which	  Wittgenstein	  explains	  what	  he	  means	  with	  the	  ex-­‐
pression	  “language	  game”	  and	  why	  he	  believes	  it	  useful	  to	  consider	  these	  primitive	  forms	  of	  lan-­‐
guage:	   «[…]	  what	   I	   shall	   call	   language	   game	   […]	   are	  ways	   of	   using	   signs	   simpler	   than	   those	   in	  
which	  we	  use	   the	   signs	  of	  our	  highly	   complicated	  everyday	   language.	   Language	  games	  are	   the	  
forms	  of	   language	  with	  which	  a	   child	  begins	   to	  make	  use	  of	  words.	   […]	  When	  we	   look	  at	   such	  
simple	  forms	  of	  language	  the	  mental	  mist	  which	  seems	  to	  enshroud	  our	  ordinary	  use	  of	  language	  
disappears.	  We	  see	  activities,	  reactions,	  which	  are	  clear-­‐cut	  and	  transparent.	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  
we	   recognize	   in	   these	   simple	   processes	   forms	   of	   language	   not	   separated	   by	   a	   break	   from	  our	  
more	  complicated	  ones»	  (BB,	  17).	  Actually,	  it	  is	  by	  perceiving	  them	  as	  part	  of	  our	  form	  of	  life	  that	  
they	  can	  function	  as	  a	  model	  for	  comparison.	   It	  does	  not	  come	  as	  a	  surprise,	  that	  Wittgenstein	  
considers	  aesthetic	  reactions	  «perhaps	  the	  most	  important	  thing	  in	  connection	  with	  aesthetics»	  
(LA,	  II	  10,	  13).	  For	  the	  interpretation	  of	  this	  claim	  of	  Wittgenstein	  see	  Säätelä	  (2002).	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gestures	   of	   approval,	   and	   that	   these	   forms	   of	   reaction	   are	   prototypes	   of	   modes	   of	  
thought.	  As	  such,	  they	  put	  a	  grammatical	  or	  conceptual	  weight	  on	  the	  use	  of	  “beautiful”	  
within	  the	  practice	  of	  aesthetic	  evaluation.	  
With	  regard	  to	  this,	  Wittgenstein’s	  considerations	  have	  a	  critical	  import.	  Since	  he	  de-­‐
picts	  the	  reaction	  that	  the	  word	  “beautiful”	  substitutes	  or	  expresses	  as	  rather	  elemen-­‐
tary,	  it	  could	  be	  doubted	  that	  this	  is	  a	  true	  aesthetic	  reaction.	  In	  fact,	  according	  to	  him,	  
an	  aesthetic	  reaction	  is	  not	  the	  mere	  expression	  of	  a	  feeling	  as	  a	  subjective	  state,	  but	  an	  
expression	  that	  «takes	  the	  form	  of	  a	  criticism»,	  that	  is,	  that	  has	  a	  cognitive	  character18.	  
The	  following	  passage	  from	  his	  Lectures	  on	  Aesthetics	  is	  emblematic.	  Wittgenstein	  does	  
not	   refer	   to	   “beautiful”,	   but	   I	   think	  we	   can	   extend	   his	   observation	   also	   to	   this	   word:	  
«When	  we	  make	  an	  aesthetic	  judgment	  about	  a	  thing,	  we	  do	  not	  just	  gape	  at	  it	  and	  say:	  
“Oh!	  How	  marvellous!”	  We	  distinguish	  between	  a	  person	  who	  knows	  what	  he	  is	  talking	  
about	  and	  a	  person	  who	  doesn’t»	  (LA,	  I,	  17,	  6).	  
Though	  we	  may	  think	  that	  “beautiful”	  expresses	  an	  aesthetic	  reaction,	  Wittgenstein	  
emphasizes	  that	  a	  person	  who	  reacts	  to	  a	  piece	  of	  music	  or	  a	  poem	  by	  using	  this	  word	  or	  
others	  similar	  to	  it	  does	  not	  know	  «what	  he	  is	  talking	  about»19.	  Aesthetic	  appreciation	  is	  
approval	  put	  into	  words20;	  therefore	  it	  presupposes	  knowledge	  of	  the	  relevant	  rules	  or	  
standards	  together	  with	  personal	  sensibility	  or	  «discernment»	  (cfr.	  LA,	  I,	  8-­‐15,	  3-­‐5)21.	  
Maybe	  Wittgenstein	  is	  going	  too	  far	  with	  his	  criticism.	  It	  is	  possible	  to	  save	  a	  role	  for	  
“beautiful”	   in	  aesthetic	   judgment,	   that	   is,	  as	  an	  expression	  of	   the	  experience	  a	  critical	  
discussion	  issues	  in,	  or,	   in	  other	  words,	  as	  a	  term	  to	  express	  the	  value	  an	  object	  has	  in	  
 
18	  As	  Simo	  Saätelä	  points	  out	  commenting	  on	  Wittgenstein’s	  Lectures	  on	  Aesthetics,	  an	  aesthetic	  
reaction	   essentially	   involves	   an	   intentional	   element	   and	   is	   «conceptually	   dependent	   upon	   our	  
perceiving	  the	  object	  in	  a	  certain	  way»	  (Säätelä	  [2002]:	  62).	  He	  further	  observes	  that	  what	  is	  in-­‐
teresting	  when	  aesthetics	  is	  concerned	  «is	  not	  primarily	  what	  I	  feel	  or	  experience,	  but	  instead	  the	  
object	  of	  my	  reaction	  […]	  what	  exactly	  disgusted	  or	  delighted	  me,	  i.e.,	  the	  object	  of	  my	  disgust	  or	  
delight»	  (Säätelä	  [2002]:	  65).	  
19	  As	  Thomas	  Tam	  points	  out,	  had	  Wittgenstein	  construed	  interjections	  as	  forms	  of	  aesthetic	  re-­‐
action,	  «he	  would	  not	  have	  repeatedly	  asserted	  that	  aesthetic	  adjectives,	  as	  words	  of	  approval	  or	  
disapproval,	  play	  hardly	  any	  role	  in	  aesthetics».	  (Tam	  [2002]:	  314)	  
20	  I	  owe	  this	  phrasing	  to	  Goyet	  (2011):	  64.	  
21	  By	   talking	   about	   rules,	  Wittgenstein	   stresses	   the	   embeddedness	   of	   appreciation	   in	   a	   culture	  
and	  a	  form	  of	  life,	  its	  historically	  specific	  character	  (cfr.	  LA,	  I,	  20,	  7;	  I	  24-­‐29,	  8-­‐9;	  I	  35,	  11	  and	  CV,	  
80e	  and	  96e).	  As	  Thomas	  Tam	  writes,	  «it	  is	  the	  whole	  culture	  of	  a	  period	  that	  renders	  possible	  a	  
certain	  form	  of	  appreciation	  and	  gives	  it	  meaning»	  (Tam	  [2002]:	  319).	  The	  learning	  of	  rules	  and	  
standards	  is	  important,	  since	  they	  provide	  a	  basic	  understanding	  of	  the	  arts,	  so	  that	  a	  person,	  in	  
considering,	  say,	  an	  eighteenth	  century	  sonnet,	  at	  least	  knows	  what	  she	  is	  talking	  about.	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virtue	  of	  its	  possession	  of	  aesthetic	  qualities	  of	  the	  kind	  Wittgenstein	  hints	  at	  when	  he	  
talks	  about	  music,	  poetry,	  suits	  or	  eyes22.	  I	  will	  not	  pursue	  his	  consideration	  on	  aesthetic	  
evaluation	  any	   further.	   Let	  me	   simply	  observe	   that	  neither	  his	   criticism	   to	   the	   idea	  of	  
beauty	  as	  a	   common	  property	  nor	  his	  emphasizing	   that	  an	  aesthetic	  adjective	   such	  as	  
“beautiful”	  plays	  hardly	  any	  role	  in	  aesthetic	  appreciation,	  do	  per	  se	  undermine	  the	  idea	  
of	  “the	  beautiful”	  as	  conceived	  of	  in	  the	  Notebooks,	  since	  “the	  beautiful”	  was	  there	  nei-­‐
ther	  a	  common	  property	  of	  beautiful	  things	  nor	  a	  quality	  that	  we	  can	  point	  out	  and	  at	  
least	  try	  to	  describe.	  However,	  Wittgenstein	  also	  hints	  at	  the	  mischief	  made	  by	  the	  con-­‐
cept	  of	  “the	  beautiful”.	  In	  the	  next	  section	  I	  will	  try	  to	  show	  that	  his	  observation	  may	  be	  
understood	  if	  we	  read	  it	  against	  the	  appropriate	  historical	  background.	  
4.	  The	  Historical	  Character	  of	  Beauty	  
According	   to	  Wittgenstein	  appreciation	   is	  embedded	   in	   the	  culture	  of	  a	  period;	   it	  pre-­‐
supposes	  knowledge	  of	  styles,	  poetics,	  etc.	  Actually,	  to	  appreciate	  a	  work	  of	  art	  one	  has	  
probably	   to	   understand	   if	   not	   necessarily	   admire	   the	   culture	   to	  which	   it	   belongs.	   In	   a	  
remark	  from	  1949	  Wittgenstein	  observed	  that	  one	  reason	  why	  authors	  «become	  dated,	  
even	  though	  they	  once	  amounted	  to	  something»,	  is	  that	  their	  writings,	  without	  the	  «re-­‐
inforcement»	  by	  their	  «contemporary	  setting»,	  die,	  «as	  if	  bereft	  of	  the	  illumination	  that	  
gave	  them	  their	  colour».	  He	  exemplifies	  the	  point	  recalling	  the	  beauty	  of	  mathematical	  
demonstrations	  that	  charmed	  Pascal	  and	  comments	  on	   it:	  «Within	  that	  way	  of	   looking	  
 
22	  In	  Ambrose’s	  notes	  Wittgenstein	  is	  reported	  as	  saying	  that	  «aesthetic	  discussion	  is	  something	  
that	  goes	  on	  inside	  the	  range	  of	  likes	  and	  dislikes»	  (AWL,	  38).	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  by	  saying	  «This	  is	  
beautiful»	  one	   is	  responding	  to	  the	  value	  she	  recognizes	   in	  an	  object	  or,	  more	  precisely,	  one	   is	  
noting	  the	  value	  of	  the	  object	  with	  pleasure	  –	  obviously,	  admiration	  is	  not	  necessarily	  pleasura-­‐
ble,	  but	  I	  doubt	  someone	  would	  use	  “beautiful”	  if	  her	  admiration	  for	  something	  were	  not	  pleas-­‐
urable.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	   in	  a	  remark	  from	  Culture	  and	  Value	  Wittgenstein	  imagines	  to	  say	  that	  
the	  eyes	  of	  a	  person	  are	  beautiful	  and,	  being	  asked	  why	  he	  finds	  them	  beautiful,	  to	  reply	  that	  he	  
finds	  beautiful	  «the	  almond	  shape,	  long	  eye-­‐lashes,	  delicate	  lids»	  (CV,	  24e).	  He	  clearly	  imagines	  
himself	  describing	  qualities	  of	  the	  eyes	  that	  make	  him	  appreciate	  them	  or	  that	  are	  the	  reason	  for	  
his	   calling	   the	  eyes	  beautiful.	   In	   cases	   like	   this,	   “beautiful”	   is	  not	   the	  name	  of	  an	   ingredient	  of	  
things;	  however,	  it	  also	  is	  not	  the	  mere	  expression	  of	  a	  feeling	  as	  a	  subjective	  state;	  rather,	  it	  ex-­‐
presses	  a	  kind	  of	  value	  or	  merit	  we	  attribute	  to	  things	  on	  the	  ground	  of	  their	  possessing	  certain	  
other	  (aesthetic)	  qualities.	  These	  qualities	  are	  reasons	  for	  exclaiming	  «How	  beautiful!»,	  though,	  
to	  use	  an	  expression	  by	  Mark	  Rowe,	  it	  is	  not	  by	  reasoning	  that	  one	  arrive	  at	  judgments	  like	  «This	  
melody	   is	  beautiful».	  Cfr.	  Rowe	   (2004):	  89	  and	  84-­‐91	   for	  a	  convincing	  defence	  of	   the	   idea	   that	  
critical	  discussions	  «can	  only	  take	  place	  within	  an	  affective	  response».	  (Rowe	  [2004]:	  91)	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at	  the	  world	  these	  demonstrations	  did	  have	  beauty.	  […]	  Again,	  a	  crystal	  is	  not	  beautiful	  
in	  just	  any	  ‘setting’	  –	  though	  perhaps	  it	  always	  looks	  attractive».	  (CV,	  79e)	  He	  closes	  the	  
remark	  observing:	   «Strange	   that	  whole	   epochs	   can’t	   free	   themselves	   from	   the	   grip	   of	  
certain	  concepts	  –	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘beautiful’	  and	  ‘beauty’	  for	  instance».	  (CV,	  79e)	  
Maybe	  he	   is	   suggesting	   that	  beauty	  has	  an	  essentially	  historical	   character	   and	   that	  
we	   cannot	   abstract	   the	   concept	   of	   beauty	   from	   its	   “environment”.	  Once	   the	   environ-­‐
ment	  has	   changed,	  we	  have	   to	   free	  ourselves	   from	   that	   concept,	  otherwise	   it	   hinders	  
the	  appreciation	  of	  works	  of	  art	  and	  other	  objects.	  Wittgenstein	  hints	  at	  this	  risk	  also	  in	  
an	  intriguing	  remark	  on	  an	  observation	  on	  Mozart	  by	  Grillparzer.	  The	  remark	  is	  interest-­‐
ing	  also	  because	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  scent	  between	  the	  lines	  his	  early	  idea	  of	  “the	  beautiful”:	  
When	   Grillparzer	   says	  Mozart	   countenanced	   only	   what	   is	   “beautiful”	   in	  music,	   I	   think	   he	  
means	  that	  he	  did	  not	  countenance	  what	  is	  distorted,	  frightful,	  that	  there	  is	  nothing	  corre-­‐
sponding	  to	  this	  in	  his	  music.	  I	  am	  not	  saying	  that	  is	  completely	  true;	  but	  even	  supposing	  it	  
to	  be	  so,	  it	  is	  still	  prejudice	  on	  Grillparzer’s	  part	  to	  think	  that	  by	  right	  it	  ought	  not	  to	  be	  oth-­‐
erwise.	  The	  fact	  that	  music	  since	  Mozart	  (and	  of	  course	  especially	  through	  Beethoven)	  has	  
extended	  the	  range	  of	  its	  language	  is	  to	  be	  neither	  commended	  nor	  deplored;	  rather:	  this	  is	  
how	  it	  has	  changed.	  There	  is	  something	  ungrateful	  about	  Grillparzer’s	  attitude.	  Did	  he	  want	  
another	  Mozart?	  Could	  he	  imagine	  what	  such	  a	  being	  might	  have	  composed?	  Could	  he	  have	  
imagined	  Mozart	  if	  he	  had	  not	  known	  him?	  
The	  concept	  of	  “the	  beautiful”	  has	  done	  a	  lot	  of	  mischief	  in	  this	  connection	  too.	  (CV,	  55e)23	  
The	  remark	   is	  pregnant	  with	  meaning.	   I	  do	  not	  even	  try	  to	  offer	  an	   interpretation	  of	   it	  
and	   limit	  myself	   to	  a	   couple	  of	  observations.	  The	   first	   is	   chronological:	  Grillparzer	  was	  
born	  in	  1791,	  the	  year	  of	  Mozart’s	  death.	  Many	  things	  had	  changed	  and	  were	  still	  chang-­‐
ing	   in	  Austrian	   society	   and	   culture.	  Wittgenstein	  hints	   at	   how	  music	   since	  Mozart	   has	  
changed,	  apparently	  suggesting	  that	  it	  is	  ungrateful	  of	  Grillparzer	  to	  judge	  the	  music	  of	  a	  
period	  according	  to	  standards	  that	  were	  of	  a	  different	  time.	  According	  to	  Wittgenstein	  
great	  art	  is	  expressive	  of	  a	  form	  of	  life	  and	  cannot	  be	  appreciated	  without	  assuming	  the	  
form	  of	  life	  embodied	  in	  it.	  This	  is	  true	  also	  of	  Mozart’s	  works.	  One	  can	  be	  nostalgic	  for	  
his	  music,	  but	  cannot	  want	  another	  Mozart	  or	  other	  music	  of	  a	  Mozartian	  kind,	  because	  
the	   “environment”	   of	   that	   music	   has	   changed.	   The	   devotion	   to	   the	   concept	   of	   “the	  
beautiful”	  prevents	  from	  acknowledging	  how,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  fact	  that	  should	  not	  be	  de-­‐
plored,	  music	  has	  changed	  its	  language	  according	  to	  changes	  in	  the	  form	  of	  life.	  
 
23	  Grillparzer	   (1837)	   wrote:	   «Shakespeare	   could	   employ	   the	   horrible;	   Mozart’s	   limit	   was	   the	  
beautiful».	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My	   second	   observation	   is	   that	   Wittgenstein	   seems	   not	   completely	   to	   agree	   with	  
Grillparzer’s	   statement	   that	  Mozart	   countenanced	   only	  what	   is	   “beautiful”	   in	  music.	   I	  
quoted	  the	  passage	  skipping	  its	  first	  lines.	  It	  begins	  by	  stating	  that	  we	  can	  speak	  of	  the	  
«distorted	  in	  music»	  in	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  we	  speak	  of	  «features	  distorted	  by	  grief».	  As	  
features	  are	  immediately	  evident,	  Wittgenstein	  seems	  to	  suggest	  that	  there	  is	  music	  in	  
which	  the	  distorted	  lies,	  so	  to	  speak,	  at	  its	  surface.	  Very	  often	  Wittgenstein	  speaks	  of	  a	  
face	  [Gesicht]	  of	  music	  (cf.	  e.g.	  CV,	  22e);	  he	  further	  states	  that	  «the	  face	   is	  the	  soul	  of	  
the	  body»	  (CV,	  23e).	  Wittgenstein	  does	  not	  say	  that	  the	  face	  expresses	  the	  soul;	  rather,	  
he	  evokes	  something	   like	  a	  bodily	  soul.	  This	  does	  not	   rule	  out	   that	   there	   is	   something	  
deep	  under	  the	  surface,	  such	  as	  a	  soul	  in	  the	  body.	  
In	   another	   remark	   on	   Mozart,	   Wittgenstein	   observes	   that	   in	   his	   music	   «fate	   [das	  
Schicksal]	  plays	  no	  role	  of	  any	  sort.	  That	  is	  not	  the	  concern	  of	  this	  music»,	  though	  Mo-­‐
zart	   could	  have	  well	   encountered	  great	   tragedy	  «in	  his	   life»	   (CV,	  81-­‐82e)24.	   In	   a	   sense	  
Mozart’s	  music	  expresses	  independence	  from	  fate	  and	  agreement	  with	  the	  world25.	  Go-­‐
ing	  back	  to	  the	  remark	  of	  the	  Notebooks	  I	  commented	  on	  in	  the	  first	  part	  of	  this	  paper,	  it	  
is	   tempting	   to	   think	   that	  Wittgenstein	   sees	   the	   features	   of	   happiness	   in	   the	   beautiful	  
face	  of	  Mozart’s	  music.	  However,	  maybe	  he	  does	  not	  see	  it	  just	  like	  Grillparzer	  does.	  He	  
distances	   himself	   a	   little	   from	  Grillparzer	   in	   that	   he	   takes	   as	   not	   completely	   true	   the	  
playwright’s	  words	  about	  Mozart’s	  music.	  Maybe	  Wittgenstein	  would	  like	  to	  make	  room	  
for	  the	  possibility	  that	  in	  that	  music	  there	  is	  something	  corresponding	  to	  the	  distorted	  or	  
frightful,	   that	  the	  admittedly	  beautiful	   face	  of	  Mozart’s	  music	  cannot	  be	  considered	  to	  
be	  all	  there	  is	  to	  it.	  The	  beauty	  of	  Mozart’s	  music	  might	  have	  a	  depth;	  it	  might	  not	  mere-­‐
ly	  consist	   in	   its	  enjoyable	  character	   (cfr.	  Tam	  [2002]:	  321).	   In	  other	  words,	   there	  could	  
be	  something	  in	  it	  corresponding	  to	  the	  distorted,	  but	  it	  would	  be	  something	  that	  does	  
not	  appear	  in	  its	  surface,	  that	  does	  not	  affect	  its	  features.	  
If	   this	   is	   correct,	   then	  Schiller’s	   line	  «Life	   is	   serious,	   art	   is	   gay»	  quoted	  by	  Wittgen-­‐
stein,	  as	  well	  as	  Wittgenstein’s	  idea	  that	  there	  is	  something	  in	  the	  conception	  that	  «the	  
 
24	  What	  Brian	  McGuinness	  recalls	  with	  regard	  to	  Schubert	  is	  interesting.	  He	  writes	  that	  Wittgen-­‐
stein	  was	  attracted	  by	  Schubert	  also	  for	  a	  reason	  «in	  which	  the	  ethical	  and	  the	  aesthetic	  were	  in-­‐
tertwined:	  the	  contrast	  of	  the	  misery	  of	  his	  life	  and	  the	  absence	  of	  all	  trace	  of	  it	  in	  his	  music,	  the	  
absence	  of	  all	  bitterness».	  (McGuinness	  [2005]:	  124)	  
25	  According	  to	  the	  theologian	  Karl	  Barth,	  what	  in	  Mozart’s	  music	  «touches	  and	  soothes	  the	  soul	  
is	  this:	  it	  seems	  to	  come	  from	  a	  height	  […]	  from	  which	  you	  can	  contemplate	  together,	  in	  their	  re-­‐
ality	  but	  also	  their	  limitations,	  the	  bright	  and	  the	  dark	  side	  of	  existence	  and	  therefore	  the	  joy	  and	  
pain,	  good	  and	  evil,	  life	  and	  death».	  (Barth	  [2008]:	  22,	  my	  translation)	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beautiful»,	  that	  is,	  what	  makes	  happy,	  is	  the	  end	  of	  art,	  catches	  an	  important	  feature	  of	  
Mozart’s	  music.	   However,	   once	   the	   possibility	   that	   “the	   beautiful”	   has	   a	   depth	   is	   ne-­‐
glected,	  and	  maybe	  Wittgenstein	  blames	  Grillparzer	  for	  having	  neglected	  it,	  what	  is	  left	  
is	  the	  beautiful	  as	  the	  merely	  pleasant,	  or	  what	  Wittgenstein	  refers	  to	  as	  what	  «superfi-­‐
cial	  people	  call	  beauty»	  (CV,	  79e).	  This	   is	  the	  easier	  way	   in	  which	  a	  concept	  of	  beauty,	  
mainly	  defined	  in	  formal	  terms	  as	  it	  happened,	  for	  example,	  in	  eighteenth-­‐century	  aes-­‐
thetics,	  can	  be	  misunderstood.	  It	  is	  easy	  to	  misunderstand	  the	  concept	  of	  beauty	  as	  con-­‐
fining	  beauty	  to	  the	  surface	  of	  things,	  setting	  it	  apart	  from	  any	  depth,	  from	  both	  cogni-­‐
tive	  and	  moral	  value.	  No	  doubt,	  there	  is	  mischief	  in	  the	  appreciation	  of	  art	  that	  this	  con-­‐
ception	  of	  “the	  beautiful”	  may	  foster	  or	  make	  worse	  (cfr.	  CV,	  55e).	  
Wittgenstein	   seems	   to	   acknowledge	   that	   the	  environment	   in	  which	   the	   concept	  of	  
beauty	  had	  a	  point	  has	  changed,	  and	  his	  observation	  about	  the	  mischief	  of	  “the	  beauti-­‐
ful”	  is	  apparently	  connected	  to	  this	  historical	  awareness26.	  However,	  I	  am	  not	  sure	  that,	  
in	  some	  way	  aligning	  himself	  with	  the	  Zeitgeist,	  he	  changed	  his	  opinion	  about	  the	  point	  
of	   the	   conception	   that	   the	   end	   of	   art	   is	   the	   beautiful.	   A	   remark	   from	   his	   later	   years	  
seems	  to	  confirm	  that	  he	  was	  looking	  at	  art	  in	  terms	  that	  were	  very	  similar	  to	  those	  of	  
his	  earlier	  work.	  
5.	  Still	  Wondering	  (After	  all	  These	  Years)	  
Before	  commenting	  on	  the	  remark	  I	  hinted	  at,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  make	  a	  couple	  of	  very	  brief	  
observations	  about	  two	  passages	  from	  Wittgenstein’s	  Lectures	  on	  Aesthetics,	  where	  he	  
apparently	  makes	   room	   for	  particular	   cases	  of	  art	  appreciation.	  According	   to	  Wittgen-­‐
stein,	   the	   learning	  of	   rules	  and	  standards	   is	  a	  prerequisite	   for	  appreciation,	   since	   they	  
provide	  a	  basic	  understanding	  of	   the	  arts	  of	  a	  period.	  However,	  he	  acknowledges	   that	  
«there	  is	  an	  extraordinary	  number	  of	  different	  cases	  of	  appreciation»	  (LA,	  I,	  21,	  7),	  and	  
that	  there	  are	  cases	  in	  which	  rules	  apparently	  do	  not	  apply	  to	  art.	  He	  is	  reported	  as	  say-­‐
ing:	  
We	  talked	  of	  correctness.	  A	  good	  cutter	  won’t	  use	  any	  words	  except	  words	  like	  ‘Too	  long’,	  
‘All	  right’.	  When	  we	  talk	  of	  a	  Symphony	  of	  Beethoven	  we	  don’t	  talk	  of	  correctness.	  Entirely	  
 
26	  We	   read	   in	   a	   remark	   from	  1949:	   «My	  own	   thinking	   about	   art	   and	   values	   is	   far	  more	  disillu-­‐
sioned	  than	  would	  have	  been	  possible	   for	  someone	  100	  years	  ago.	  That	  doesn’t	  mean,	  though,	  
that	  it’s	  more	  correct	  on	  that	  account.	  It	  only	  means	  that	  I	  have	  examples	  of	  degeneration	  in	  the	  
forefront	  of	  my	  mind	  which	  were	  not	  in	  the	  forefront	  of	  men’s	  mind	  then».	  (CV,	  79e)	  
Gabriele	  Tomasi,	  Wittgenstein	  on	  “Beautiful”	  and	  “The	  Beautiful” 
pag.	  133	  
©	  Firenze	  University	  Press	  •	  Aisthesis	  •	  1/2013	  •	  www.fupress.com/aisthesis	  •	  ISSN	  2035-­‐8466 
different	  things	  enter.	  One	  wouldn’t	  talk	  of	  appreciating	  the	  tremendous	  things	  in	  Art.	  In	  cer-­‐
tain	  styles	  in	  Architecture	  a	  door	  is	  correct,	  and	  the	  thing	  is	  you	  appreciate	  it.	  But	  in	  the	  case	  
of	  a	  Gothic	  Cathedral	  what	  we	  do	  is	  not	  at	  all	  to	  find	  it	  correct	  –	  it	  plays	  an	  entirely	  different	  
role	  with	  us.	  The	  entire	  game	  is	  different.	  It	  is	  as	  different	  as	  to	  judge	  a	  human	  being	  and	  on	  
the	  one	  hand	  to	  say	  ‘He	  behaves	  well’	  and	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  ‘He	  made	  a	  great	  impression	  
on	  me’.	  (LA,	  I,	  23,	  7-­‐8)	  
Wittgenstein	   seems	   to	  make	   room	   for	   a	   kind	   of	   evaluation	   different	   from	   the	   one	   in	  
terms	  of	  correctness.	  There	  are	  cases	   in	  which	   talking	  of	  correctness	  appears	   inappro-­‐
priate	  not	  because	  the	  work	  that	  we	  encounter	   is	  not	  rule-­‐governed,	  but	  probably	  be-­‐
cause	  it	  made	  a	  great	  impression	  on	  us,	  so	  that	  we	  feel	  in	  some	  sense	  dominated	  by	  it.	  
Without	  being	  incorrect,	  or	  maybe	  breaking	  some	  rules,	  the	  work	  goes	  beyond	  the	  idea	  
of	  correctness.	  Wittgenstein’s	  comparison	  of	  such	  cases	  to	  the	  judging	  of	  a	  human	  being	  
is	  revealing.	  By	  saying:	  «He	  behaves	  well»	  we	  apply	  to	  another	  person	  the	  same	  stand-­‐
ards	  of	  correctness	  that	  apply	  to	  us;	  but	  when	  a	  person	  makes	  a	  great	  impression	  on	  us	  
the	  kind	  of	  response	  is	  different:	  we	  are	  not	  appreciating	  her	  for	  the	  correctness	  of	  her	  
behaviour	  (cfr.	  Tam	  [2002]:	  317).	  
In	  a	   later	  section	  of	  the	  Lectures,	  Wittgenstein	  seems	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  not	  only	  
the	  critical	  attitude	  of	  connoisseurs	  counts	  as	  appreciation,	  but	  also	   the	  response	   to	  a	  
work	  of	  art	  that	  could	  be	  characterized	  as	  being	  impressed	  by	  it.	  He	  speaks	  of	  a	  person	  
«who	  looks	  intensely»	  at	  a	  couple	  of	  paintings,	  among	  the	  few	  he	  has	  seen,	  which	  make	  
«a	  profound	   impression	  on	  him»	  (LA,	   I,	  30,	  9).	  Being	   impressed	  by	  a	  work	   is	  clearly	  an	  
emotional	  response;	  if	  nevertheless	  Wittgenstein	  calls	  it	  “appreciation”,	  presumably	  it	  is	  
because	  he	  assumes	  that	  it	  presupposes	  at	  least	  an	  implicit	  knowledge	  of	  the	  rules	  of	  a	  
genre	  and	  a	  culture27.	  However,	   it	   is	  also	  possible	  to	  read	  the	  passage	  as	  an	  admission	  
that	  a	  sense	  of	   fascination,	  of	  admiration	  could	  belong	  to	  our	  response	  to	  art.	  Though	  
not	  every	  work	  can	  command	  such	  a	  response,	  there	  are	  cases	  in	  which,	  in	  our	  apprecia-­‐
tion	   of	   a	  work	   of	   art,	   it	   is	   essential	   that	  we	   feel	   enthusiastic,	   that	  we	   feel	   a	   sense	   of	  
wonder	  about	  it.	  In	  regard	  to	  this,	  the	  following	  remark	  of	  Wittgenstein	  from	  1947	  is	  re-­‐
vealing:	  
The	  miracles	  of	  nature.	  
One	  might	  say:	  art	  shows	  us	  the	  miracles	  of	  nature.	  It	  is	  based	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  miracles	  
of	  nature.	  (The	  blossom,	  just	  opening	  out.	  What	  is	  marvellous	  about	  it?)	  We	  say:	  «Just	  look	  
at	  it	  opening	  out!»	  (CV,	  56e)	  
 
27	  A	  similar	  point	  is	  made	  by	  Tam	  (2002):	  322.	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This	   text	   echoes	   the	   young	  Wittgenstein’s	   idea	   that	   the	   artistic	  miracle	   or	   the	   artistic	  
wonder	   is	   that	  what	   exists	   does	   exist.	  Wittgenstein	   seems	   to	   consider	   the	   concept	   of	  
miracle	  or	  wonders	  of	  nature	  as	   the	  basis	  of	  art.	  Again,	  not	  every	  work	  can	  command	  
such	  a	  response.	  We	  should	  not	  generalize	  Wittgenstein’s	  claim.	  However,	  we	  can	  make	  
room	  for	  cases	  in	  which	  a	  sense	  of	  admiration,	  or	  of	  wonder	  belongs	  to	  our	  appreciation	  
of	  art.	  Sometimes	  it	  is	  feelings	  like	  these	  that	  words	  such	  as	  “beautiful”	  or	  “marvellous”	  
convey	  and	  when	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  they	  are	  not	  mere	  substitutes	  of	  interjections,	  nor	  ex-­‐
pressions	  of	  an	  emotion.	  Uttered	  when	  being	  impressed	  by	  something,	  be	  it	  the	  opening	  
out	  of	  the	  blossom	  or	  a	  work	  of	  art,	  “Marvellous!”	  or	  “Beautiful!”	  articulate	  our	  sense	  of	  
wonder	  and	  wonder	  is	  more	  akin	  to	  a	  way	  of	  seeing	  things	  than	  to	  an	  emotive	  response.	  
There	   is	   a	   further	   point	   worth	   noticing	   in	  Wittgenstein’s	   remark.	   To	   the	   question	  
«What	   is	  marvellous	  about	  the	  blossom	  opening?»	  he	  does	  not	  answer	  with	  a	  descrip-­‐
tion,	  but	  with	  an	  exhortation:	  «Just	  look	  at	  it	  opening	  out!».	  As	  Thomas	  Tam	  points	  out,	  
this	  exhortation	  must	  be	  taken	  «as	  a	  pointing	  to	  or	  a	  showing	  of	  something,	  rather	  than	  
a	  mere	  expressive	  gesture»	  ([2002]:	  315).	  This	  suggests	  that	  art	   is	  sometimes	  a	  kind	  of	  
showing	  of,	  since	  what	  it	  points	  to	  –	  the	  miracles	  or	  wonders	  of	  nature	  –	  is	  beyond	  lan-­‐
guage	  and	  therefore	  can	  only	  be	  shown.	  If	  we	  connect	  this	  suggestion	  to	  the	  idea	  articu-­‐
lated	  by	  Wittgenstein	  in	  the	  remark	  from	  Culture	  and	  Value,	  according	  to	  which	  art	  forc-­‐
es	  us	  to	  the	  right	  perspective,	  we	  have	  that	  for	  Wittgenstein	  art,	  or	  at	  least	  some	  kind	  of	  
art,	   is	  like	  an	  invitation	  to	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  experience	  of	  contemplating	  an	  object;	  and	  
we	  can	  see	  that	  in	  relation	  to	  this	  kind	  of	  art	  the	  use	  of	  “beautiful”	  has	  a	  point.	  
Going	   back	   to	   Wittgenstein’s	   blossom	   example,	   this	   hints	   at	   the	   fact	   that	   finding	  
something	  marvellous	   or	   beautiful	   is	   connected	   to	   paying	   attention	   to	   it	   and	   recom-­‐
mending	   it	   to	   the	  attention	  of	  others,	  while	  being	  unable	   to	   conceptualize	   the	   reason	  
why	  it	  draws	  our	  attention.	  It	  is	  tempting	  to	  link	  the	  blossom	  example	  with	  the	  following	  
passage	  that	  we	  read	  in	  students’	  notes	  from	  a	  lecture	  by	  Wittgenstein,	  which	  was	  part	  
of	  a	  lecture-­‐series	  on	  description:	  
One	  of	  the	  most	  interesting	  points	  which	  the	  question	  of	  not	  being	  able	  to	  describe	  is	  con-­‐
nected	  with,	  [is	  that]	  the	  impression	  which	  a	  certain	  verse	  or	  bar	  in	  music	  gives	  you	  is	  inde-­‐
scribable.	  «I	  don’t	  know	  what	  it	  is.	  […]	  Look	  at	  this	  transition.	  […]	  What	  is	  it?	  […]».	  I	  think	  you	  
would	  say	  it	  gives	  you	  experiences	  which	  can’t	  be	  described.	  First	  of	  all	   it	   is,	  of	  course,	  not	  
true	  that	  whenever	  we	  hear	  a	  piece	  of	  music	  or	  a	  line	  of	  poetry	  which	  impresses	  us	  greatly,	  
we	  say:	  «This	  is	  indescribable».	  But	  it	  is	  true	  that	  again	  and	  again	  we	  do	  feel	  inclined	  to	  say:	  
«I	  can’t	  describe	  my	  experience».	   I	  have	   in	  mind	  a	  case	  that	  saying	  one	   is	   incapable	  of	  de-­‐
scribing	  comes	  from	  being	  intrigued	  and	  wanting	  to	  describe,	  asking	  oneself:	  «What	  is	  this?	  
What’s	  he	  doing,	  wanting	  to	  do	  here?	  –	  Gosh,	  if	  I	  could	  only	  say	  what	  he’s	  doing	  here».	  (LC,	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Following	  a	  suggestion	  by	  Avner	  Baz,	   I	   speculate	  that	   this	   finding	  ourselves	  wanting	  to	  
describe	  something	  that	  we	  see	  or	  hear	  or	  otherwise	  encounter	  and	  whose	  description	  
eludes	  us,	  gets	  us	  close	  to	  the	  use	  of	  “beauty”	  or	  “beautiful”	   I	  am	  talking	  about,	  when	  
we	   resist	   the	   temptation	   to	   seek	   to	   ground	  our	   being	   so	   drawn	   into	   something	  other	  
than	  the	  thing	  as	  we	  experience	  it.	  
In	   an	   important	   sense,	   beauty	   is	   about	   the	   presentness	   of	   and	   responsiveness	   to	  
something,	  and	  there	  are	  moments	  in	  which,	  by	  calling	  a	  work	  of	  art	  “beautiful”	  we	  lend	  
our	  voice	  to	  what	  in	  the	  work	  reveals	  itself	  to	  us	  (cfr.	  Baz	  [2004]:	  70)29.	  In	  these	  cases	  it	  
is	  not	  for	  not	  knowing	  «what	  is	  in	  it	  at	  all»,	  that	  we	  gape	  at	  it	  and	  say:	  «How	  beautiful!»	  
or	  «How	  marvellous!»;	  rather,	   it	   is	  because	  sometimes	  art	  confronts	  us	  as	  a	  miracle	  or	  
presents	  us	  the	  wonder	  of	  the	  being	  there	  of	  what	  there	  is.	  In	  such	  cases	  the	  reasons	  of	  
our	  appreciation	  of	  the	  work	  remain	  ineffable	  because	  we	  simply	  cannot	  put	  into	  words	  
what	  is	  beyond	  language.	  
6.	  Conclusion	  
In	   this	  paper	  we	  have	  seen	   that	  Wittgenstein	  denies	   that	  beauty	   is	  a	  property	  and	  ar-­‐
gues	  that	  in	  practices	  of	  art	  appreciation	  the	  aesthetic	  adjective	  “beautiful”	  plays	  hardly	  
any	  role	  and	  is	  mainly	  used	  by	  people	  who	  lack	  basic	  understanding	  of	  art.	  Furthermore,	  
he	  acknowledges	   that	   the	   form	  of	   life	   in	  which	   the	  concept	  of	  beauty	  had	  a	  point	  has	  
changed.	  However,	  he	  still	  makes	  room	  for	  beauty	  and	  the	  beautiful.	  And	  it	  is	  interesting	  
that	  this	  happens,	  insofar	  as	  he	  connects	  art	  to	  miracle.	  It	  is	  because	  of	  this	  very	  connec-­‐
tion	  that	   I	  am	  tempted	  to	  say	  that	  Wittgenstein’s	  early	   idea	  that	  there	   is	  something	   in	  
the	  conception	  that	  the	  beautiful	  is	  the	  end	  of	  art	  was	  still	  alive	  in	  his	  later	  writings.	  And	  
I	   guess	   the	   reason	   is	   that	   this	   idea	  was	  deeply	   rooted	   into	  Wittgenstein’s	   attitude	   to-­‐
wards	  life.	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